Idle DAO (stkIDLE holders)

The following is an extract of the proposal posted on the Idle governance.

Summary

A proposal to transfer the Governance Timelock admin to the Treasury Leagues multisig before the forthcoming IDLE snapshot to mitigate the risk of governance attack.

Background

The Idle DAO governance relies on token-weighted voting, which is effective in normal conditions. However, this system can be vulnerable to governance attacks if an actor acquires a significant amount of IDLE tokens. […]

Currently, Idle DAO governance holds critical control via Governor Bravo, which in turn uses the Idle Timelock over all BY products, the Fee treasury, ecosystem funds, long term LP funds and other DAO contracts.

Proposal

The primary goal of this proposal is to prevent a governance attack that could happen after the upcoming IDLE snapshot. […]

A malicious actor could purchase IDLE tokens at market prices, which will likely be impacted by the forthcoming snapshot, gain significant voting power, and execute harmful proposals. These include but are not limited to:

• Stealing DAO treasury funds: Redirecting funds intended for community growth or strategic initiatives held in the DAO treasury.
• Disrupting Best Yield functionalities: reallocating funds deposited in the Best Yield smart contracts.

By temporarily transferring the admin of the Governance Timelock to the TL multisig, the Idle DAO can ensure that critical functions are safeguarded against potential exploits during this transition period.

This proposal is a proactive measure to strengthen the Idle DAO’s governance structure and protect the protocol from potential threats. By moving the admin of the Timelock contract to the TL multisig before the upcoming IDLE snapshot, we ensure that the protocol remains secure, reduce the risk of governance attack, and safeguard DAO treasury and Best Yield users.