Lido DAO

TL;DR

A second vote on whether the 39.8 ETH that flowed into the Lido DAO Treasury, as a result of an exploited vulnerability in SushiSwap RouteProcessor2, should be sent to sifuvision.eth (the affected party) as an expression of goodwill?

The previous vote was split 67% / 33% in favour of sending the ETH, but quorum was not reached.

Motivation

Untangling the original post and discussion, two, largely orthogonal, decisions at hand may be derived:

1. A decision on an outflow of 39.8 ETH from the Lido DAO treasury to help Sushi (this is the amount which came into the treasury as a result of the exploit).
2. A wider policy decision on whether or not the DAO should ever act as an arbiter between stakers, node operators, and third parties – and if so, how, and under what conditions.

The discussion under the original post has revolved almost entirely around the second decision – yet this has not been made clear within the discussion itself.

To minimize the risk of decisions, on both fronts, being made for the wrong reasons, it makes sense to move these two decisions into separate threads where they can be discussed individually.

Key points

Concerns of the type that Hasu and Misha have raised in the original thread are not especially relevant to this initial decision at hand.

In particular:

• Lido DAO does not a priori need a broader framework to make decisions on what to do about unexpected treasury inflows.
• Voting in favour of this decision does not turn the Lido DAO into an arbiter or open up a slippery slope that could detract from its neutrality.

Voting options

• Send 39.8 ETH to sifuvision.eth
• No action

Actual transfer in case of approval by Lido DAO be done via Aragon on-chain vote.