Dopewars

GM DOPE DAO

We believe it is important to acknowledge and reimburse all those who have made efforts to progress DOPE DAO through the Governance Process. Many members have spent significant amounts of ETH progressing the DAO. As well as this we think it is important to clearly describe the process that will protect the DAO’s governance process in times ahead; especially when we will be again subject to periods of high GAS exposure.

RECLAIM:

DopeLabs has come up with a method to reclaim GAS that is fair and will stand up to audit. We have worked through all 70 odd proposals and manually added up the GAS used for Proposing, Queuing and Executing proposals. The reclaim will not include any GAS used for voting. It would be too subjective to attempt to establish the difference between community voting and delegation voting. The values of ETH used for Proposing, Queuing and Executing, as shown on Etherscan, will be returned to the wallets it came from. This will ‘clean the slate’ in a fair and transparent way so we can thereon establish a fair protocol for future GAS Governance issues. You will see the table attached that displays this manual calculation.

OPP:

The set-up of the Official Proposal Process (OPP) was designed to maximise democratic value, maintain governance integrity and protect our governance mechanism during times when GAS expense may hinder our ability to have an effective system. The key is that the real voting happens during the OFF CHAIN Vote - At this time Snapshot. The OFF CHAIN mechanism is free and it only counts DOPE that you own. This makes it a true representation of 1 DOPE = 1 VOTE.

Then as per the OPP, the ON CHAIN proposal must be the same as the OFF CHAIN Proposal. The ON CHAIN vote is still an integral part of the process. In many cases it is required (practically) to release funds from the treasury via input of executable code. In all cases it is a means by which to stamp our governance acts on chain and forever record our process in an immutable way. Always, when viewed as part of the whole OPP, it is a fail safe way to protect the DAO from random acts of Governance (or directorship) that would be open to a DAO that did not have a mechanism such as this. This is why even with distribution of OP Grant funds, which are held in a MultiSig, the DAO must still complete the entire OPP before any funds can be manually released. Not only does this protect the integrity of the governance process but it also protects the Members on the MultiSig from any incidents, perceived or real, of misappropriation.

DELEGATES:

How many Members would be keen to spend $50 USD to vote a proposal through that releases funds each month to cover DAO Operational Expenses like Website hosting costs? We have a ON CHAIN Quorum requirement of 500 votes before the vote will pass and release funds from the treasury. If larger DOPE holders become tired of spending so much ETH on GAS this could mean that it might take a lot of Members to get the proposal over quorum. Say for example 50 Members with 10 DOPE’s - I’ve made the math simple for my smol brain… it’s a big number. Even if it’s $5 per vote, that is still $250 USD just to execute a business as usual transaction. So we can see why it is an important part of the system to have delegate voters. Remembering that the real voting has already happened OFF CHAIN and the ON CHAIN proposal must be the same, in most cases it is just an administrative function to punch in the executable code and use delegates to get the vote above quorum. This could currently be as little as 2 delegates required to achieve the result.

FUTURE:

For any future GAS reclaims we propose that delegates can claim GAS if they are voting, on behalf of the DAO, to get a proposal that has passed the OFF CHAIN stage, past quorum ON CHAIN. This is not to suggest that Members cannot vote whenever it pleases them, just that Members who vote where delegates vote the proposal past quorum cannot reclaim.

We suggest that a Proposer can reclaim gas if they are putting up a Proposal as a sponsor for the community, or for a proposal that is in the interest of the DAO only. Think for example the recent Arrakis Liquidity proposal or a proposal to release funds for standard operating costs. If a proposal is put up that benefits the proposer, then they should either account for gas in their proposal or absorb the cost. The way the OPP is designed, and the above, is the best way we can think of to have a system that will actually work to allow the community to vote on what it wants at all times even when GAS can be as high as 100 GWEI. Until such a time when DOPE DAO can look at L2 Governance, whatever that might look like and if it ever eventuates.

TLDR:

This proposal will vote to authorise the abovementioned GAS Reclaim to ‘clean the slate’ and to set a baseline protocol for any future GAS Reclaims that pertain to DAO Delegate Voting and Sponsored Proposing.

The following wallets will have their gas expenses reimbursed for a total of 1.237385808 in ETH

Wallet	ETH
0x440daa861400bf754b83121479bf26895f1df7c4	0.132415507
0x50258a2ae0b3065754936828cd7814731c6fc008	0.001953583
0xa2de2d19edb4094c79fb1a285f3c30c77931bf1e	0.217754323
0xb79c3dbe11fd600032c8d100ac8cc87ed49a0320	0.009646477
0xba740c9035ff3c24a69e0df231149c9cd12bae07	0.226679075
0xc2407b34b19d2227addc5c6eae5c5d99432a0c99	0.015364474
0xced10840f87a2320fdca1dbe17d4f8e4211840a8	0.193570069
0xd4b65db36026ddf08859b8175c02c611fde0a020	0.373462886
0xe8d848debb3a3e12aa815b15900c8e020b863f31	0.010452977
0xf8c3875bfa461a38532fedf90453985901c55114	0.014154154
0x0331969e189d63fbc31d771bb04ab44227d748d8	0.041932283
Total	1.237385808

For a full list of the transactions see the proposal in notion https://dope-wars.notion.site/DIP-74-Governance-Gas-Reclaim-5e801f621c1d4b39a13cce1423775929

DopeLabs Crew