TheGraphCouncil

The previous vote for this GGP expired before Council members could vote: https://snapshot.org/#/council.graphprotocol.eth/proposal/0x40370601669c1c772bbb07042c96526f90d96cb14c34fa5de36a9fe42d31c69a - so this is a second attempt for the same proposal.

GIP-0041 Title: Store Dispute Status on Resolution Authors: jordan@soulbound.xyz goose@soulbound.xyz Abstract: The Dispute Manager contract allows fisherman to police Indexer activity by submitting disputes for invalid indexing or query responses. Right now, disputes are deleted on resolution instead of being marked as accepted, rejected, or drawn. This prevents other smart contracts from tracking the status of disputes and past Indexer slashing events. Rather than delete disputes, this proposal suggests that the Dispute Manager contract should permanently store disputes alongside their status.

Motivation: Spyglass Labs is building a Subgraph Bridge designed to offload prohibitively expensive computations from the EVM to The Graph. Our goal is to prevent query responses from Indexers from being certified on-chain if that response is tied to either an active or valid dispute. We consider this is a great addition to the core functionality of the Dispute Manager that will help transform subgraphs into read-oriented rollups.

GIP-0059 Title: Remove Owner Tax Authors: Ariel Barmat, Adam Fuller Abstract: We propose setting the owner tax on the GNS to 0%, effectively disabling this mechanism that works any time a subgraph owner publishes a new version.

Motivation: The idea of introducing an “owner tax” was to prevent a grieving attack in which a subgraph owner repeatedly publishes new versions and then drains its curators via the “curation tax”. The consequence is that it also introduces friction every time an honest subgraph owner updates their versions:

They need to have GRT available in the wallet everytime they publish a new version. This in addition to having ETH to pay for transaction fees. Mental cost of planning the amount of GRT they need for paying the tax. If the curation pool is big enough it can amount to a high value. Our belief is that this adds unnecessary high friction for little gain considering the reality of the curation market. Our observation about how the curation market developed in the last two years shows that subgraph owners do most of their own curation as they are naturally incentivized to have their subgraph indexed on the network. Additionally, we believe that if a subgraph owner misbehave it will be penalized by curators and they will then be more careful at verifying the accounts that create those subgraphs before supporting them.