Aavegotchi

Author: Fantasma (16184) Quorum Requirement: 20% (9M) Vote Duration: 21 days Discussion: https://discord.com/channels/732491344970383370/1351529648424615966

Summary: Through the past year or so, after Polygon liquidity of GHST(governance token) has decreased because of multiple reasons -including segmentation to Base and Geist networks - passing essential proposals for the continued and proper functioning of Aavegotchi DAO has become ever-more challenging. Most recently, a proposal to honor previously made commitments to participants of the “Gotchi points” campaign came dangerously close to not passing due to quorum. The reality the DAO is dealing with re. proposals is that a handful of individuals (just one or two members in some scenarios) currently wield the power to “filibuster” the implementation of essential proposals… where the other hundreds of users see their will and voting power become irrelevant. Arbitrarily or subjectively proposing to lower quorum requirements is something that has previously been avoided when facing these challenges re. the 9mm VP GHST quorum that the DAO has observed for a very long time.

Proposed solution: -Instead of choosing some random or arbitrary number as the proposed new quorum requirement, this proposal recommends excluding DAO-owned-GHST (as of the end of February 2025), and make the new minimum requirement that of 7.2 mm GHST for passing signal and core proposals. Excluding DAO-owned VP is something that should have been instituted before, as not doing so has placed extra stress and burden for passing essential props that reflect the will of the majority of DAO members. The DAO owned VP is not used on votes by definition, so continuing to observe it for quorum purposes is an unnecessary and arguably illogical obstacle to the functioning of the DAO.

-Additionally, this proposal recommends doubling the current XP reward for voters as follows:

20 XP for voting on a successful signal proposal 40 XP for voting on a successful core proposal These measures should incentivize active engagement by DAO members when voting on proposals, address voter exhaustion, and furthermore, prevent those who don’t want to vote from being incessantly lobbied or criticized when exercising their right to abstain from casting a vote.

The 7.2mm figure will need to be monitored and could be adjusted via a new proposal, especially if it becomes inadequate after migration of most ecosystem assets and functions to Base network.

Passing of this proposal would mean that the increased reward would take immediate effect and be awarded to voting members of this very prop.